CHINA AND GLOBAL NORMS

Event Report
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EVENT REPORT

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Executive Summary

1. How has China respected, resisted, and reformed international norms in global governance? To what extent is China a "responsible" actor? And how does it work with major international institutions? These questions were the focus of the China Programme's November 2017 conference, which brought together a diverse group of nineteen scholars hailing from China, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Singapore.

2. It is proposed that scholars and policymakers need to examine functional, issue-based leadership across the international system. The United States, and other Western nations might continue to be the agenda-setters on some issues; while China exercises leadership in other issues.

3. China simultaneously seeks to respect, resist, and reform different aspects of existing regimes. For example, despite its own problematic human rights record, China has managed – by facilitating the creation of the Universal Periodic Review in 2005-2006 – to reorient the global human rights regime away from the singling out of specific abusers. In another example, China's investment and development assistance has selectively conformed to international norms, and, at the same time, challenged the way traditional investors and donors think.

4. Even so, some questions remain zero sum, as the case of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank seems to demonstrate. China's initiative was interpreted as a challenge to America's dominance of the international system. Reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions, the World Bank, and International Monetary Fund, is also zero sum, and is seen as nearly impossible to achieve. Consequently, since global reform has stalled, China is increasingly focused on creating new organisations and initiatives (e.g., financial credit agencies), through which it can project its influence and pursue its interests.

5. China can proceed with less constraint when all that is required is inventing something new, but with respect to issues such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and global internet governance, China's influence and its prospects for normative reform are much more limited.

6. Some issues are more ambiguous. For example, China is seeking to redefine anti-terrorism norms in a way which is congruent with its socio-political campaign against the so-called "three evil forces" (terrorism, ethnic separatism, and religious extremism), but the lack of clear global standards and America's own un-exemplary record make the issue less than black and white.

7. In the fields of human rights, humanitarian assistance, and refugee accommodation, China's general position and core principles have not changed significantly. However, the political will to actively participate in international agencies' effort in relief delivery and provision of developmental aids has emerged from the top level of decision making in China. Moreover, China's participation in global health governance is a good sign that China will converge with the United States in determining how to proceed with global governance mechanisms. After the New York Declaration in 2016, the normative gap between the new principles endorsed by the United Nations and China in the field of refugee issues is also narrowing. After years of learning, China not only has started development assistance, but also launched a wave of new projects that involves a third party – usually a partner government of the Organisation for Economic Co-ordination and Development (OECD) – and adopt commonly used practices by international assistance agencies.

8. As China's rise becomes palpable to some state, intergovernmental organisations, and businesses, the question of China's complex relationship with the global normative order will be increasingly obvious, which deserves scholars and policymakers' continuing attention.

PANEL ONE
Overview and Introduction

1.1 China and the challenge to liberal universalism

Professor Shaun Breslin opened the conference by reflecting on the nature of China's rise and the extent to which it challenges the status quo. He argued that the proper assumption for a rising power is that it would be strange if China *were not* dissatisfied with the established order. But what does dissatisfaction mean? And what is the established order?

Breslin argued that two basic distinctions should be employed to answer these questions properly. First, there is a fundamental difference between seeking to reform the existing order – and redistribution of power within it – and directly challenging the order. Second, there is a fundamental difference between challenging the *American*-led order and the *liberal* order. China's challenge is directed towards American leadership, not the liberal order itself, of which China has been the main beneficiary over the past generation. China's challenge is thus: "reform without breaking".

So how can China go about changing the order, especially since the global leader (America) is not keen on its rise, without breaking the system? Breslin thinks the neglected book, *The Working Peace System*, by David Mitrany, originally published in 1944, can be of use here. Mitrany proposed a functional global order based on areas of expertise, with the forms of organisation dependent on specific issues. This is a way to think of global order in a non-polar way. A total, holistic transfer of power from the United States to China is not in the cards; instead, we are likely to see different sets and issues in which China can be the *leader* in some and the *problem* in others. This is something like Brantly Womack's multi-nodal world or Amitav Acharya's multiplex world. In international development, in particular, China is seeking to be a leader, and on human rights, many would consider China the problem. Going forward, China – and indeed, the United States – are going to have to focus on *followership*. We are not going to see a smooth transition, but functional differentiation.

According to Breslin, Europe has, at least in part, recognised the limited nature of China's challenge, and consequently Europe is accepting of China's rise. Europe's concern, far from seeking to prevent China's rise

like the United States, is to figure out how to live with it and benefit from it. Europe believes it can condition China's rise through engagement and trade; security elements are less relevant to the UK and EU decision-makers. Indeed, in the UK cabinet, the biggest perceived threat is not China's rise, but that it might not continue to rise.

Going forward, therefore, scholars and policymakers should be attuned to functional, issues-based leadership in the international system in which rising states like China lead in some areas and follow in others. If Mitrany was right, this may in fact be a boon and not a bane.

1.2 Xi's China and the pursuit of the responsible power identity

Hoo Tiang Boon presented a paper reflecting his long-term research interests on China's construction and projection of its identity as a responsible power. While recognising that power dynamics are important, Hoo suggests that a fuller assessment of China's changing relationship with global order can be reached by addressing the identity discourses that contextualise the meaning of growing Chinese power. Here, discursive developments are examined from two levels of analysis: the state level (official statements) and the sub-state level (intellectual arguments and thinking).

At the state level, President Xi Jinping has prioritised global governance as a key aspect of Chinese foreign policy. At a Politburo study session in October 2015, Xi stated that China would firmly "safeguard" the existing global order. This point was again reinforced during Xi's Davos speech in January 2017. Such statements suggest a China that is becoming more proactive and less reticent about global leadership, one that is moving away from its traditional "low-profile" strategic approach towards one which "strives for achievement."

In the intellectual terrain, many Chinese scholars see international responsibility as a positive notion that should be further embraced by China. Here, Hoo highlighted some Chinese arguments on the question of China's obligations. Among others, these narratives: (i) emphasise the importance of balancing China's interests, rights, and responsibilities; (ii) propose "responsibility coordination" among great powers as one potential way of moderating the dangers of big power conflict; and (iii) perceive the idea of global responsibility from the lens of strategic opportunity.

1.3 China, role identity, and global governance: insights from AIIB

He Kai centered his presentation around three questions: Why did China initiate the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)? Why did the United States try to stop it? Why did other western countries (the United Kingdom) join it but others did not (Japan)? He suggested that the existing answers – which focus on the failure to reform the International Monetary Fund (IMF), poor US diplomacy following the Chinese initiative, and China's successful charm offensive in the United Kingdom – are all too simplistic. Instead, he sees the AIIB as part of a "leadership transition" in global governance, and posits that "institutional balancing theory" can help better answer the questions.

Drawing on role theory, which has laid out certain expected functions for leaders, challengers, and followers, He Kai argued that those who perceive themselves as leaders will likely adopt an "exclusive institutional balancing" approach, which sees any prospect of alternative leadership as threatening and so seeks to exclude competitors from institutions, or an "inter-institutional" approach, which seeks to gain a leadership role in alternative institutions. In contrast, those who perceive themselves as challengers will adopt an "inclusive institutionalist balancing" approach because they need to gain recognition and legitimation from others. Followers, meanwhile, can adopt either strategy dependent on their prioritisation of security.

According to He Kai, this template can help explain what happened with the AIIB: China, in the role of a challenger, proposed a new institution that would include other states; the United States, in the role of the leader, sought to prevent its allies and friends from joining; and the United Kingdom, in the role of a follower motivated by economic interests joined while Japan, motivated by security concerns, did not. He ended his presentation on a normative note: peaceful leadership transition in the international system remains possible, but existing leaders will have to accommodate the legitimate requests of rising powers, rather than seeking their exclusion from the international system.

1.4 China's evolving strategy towards counter-terrorism

Katherine Morton presented the closing paper of the introductory panel, reflecting on the tensions between China's perceived national security imperatives vis-à-vis "terrorism" and the global normative order. The core argument of her discussion is that China is playing a more active security role in Central and South Asia, and its coordination with other countries, particularly through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, has the potential to broaden the normative boundaries of what "terrorism" means in the socio-political realm. So far, Morton assesses that China has been relatively successful in socialising Central Asian states against the so-called "three evil forces" (terrorism, ethnic separatism, and religious extremism). China has hence reframed its domestic counter-terrorism concerns in terms of international movements. The outstanding question is how China will adapt to more general international norms, and this query may become even more important as Pakistan and India enter the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, reducing China's dominance of regional dynamics.

Discussion

Li Mingjiang thought Breslin's distinction between the US-led order and the liberal order was fair, and suggested it might be worthwhile to look at the loopholes in current global governance and whether China can fill some of them. He further asked: how does China balance its own interests and the promotion of global public goods? On Hoo's paper, Li wondered about the relationship between Chinese discourse and China's actions in global governance. With reference to He's leadership role theory, the question remains: Did China have the intention to use AIIB as a tool to achieve leadership transition? If so, did it succeed, and how would we know? Finally, Li thought Morton's paper on China's national security culture and emerging anti-terrorism regime might benefit from the role theory categories of leader, challenger, and follower.

Richard Bush observed that the idea of a responsible power goes back to Franklin Roosevelt in World War II (WWII) and was revived in the context of China by Robert Zoellick, and he concurred that identity discourse does make a difference, as it did, for example, on Cross-Straits questions during the Hu Jintao period. Even so, Chinese rhetoric could be a rationalisation

of behaviour or a deception effort, and China's "responsible power" framework seems to apply *outside* of East Asia; in its own region, China is more interested in contending directly for its interests. The test of the responsible power framework would be to find instances where we expect certain *realpolitik* behaviours, but then get something else, and *vice versa*. As for the AIIB, Bush thought that He's theory was interesting, but it needed more empirical support for the US role in the crisis. In the United States, the Department of the Treasury and the National Economic Council misperceived the AIIB as a threat, something induced by Xi Jinping's May 2014 speech, so AIIB was viewed through the lens of a China that wanted to *exclude* the United States. Even if Obama wanted the United States to join, Congress would not have permitted it.

Other discussants commented that once China announced the AIIB, there was a *followership* competition between the United Kingdom and Germany, with the former seeking to outdo the latter, which is an important emerging dynamic in international politics. Another dynamic, which is harder to pin down, is whether China, though not directly challenging the world order now, might do so after its "national rejuvenation" succeeds. One panelist observed that in answering this, analysts are trapped by both the past and the future: we do not know the future, and for the past, we look to other historical cases (such as Germany's rise) which may not be the most accurate point of comparison.

PANEL TWO
Security and New Security

2.1 China and the international law of the sea: compliance, resistance, and norm creation

Wang Jiangyu opened the second panel, arguing that China is reinterpreting existing norms and simultaneously seeking to create new norms in the South China Sea (SCS). China did lose the SCS arbitration case, but this does not mean its claims were without legal foundation; after all, it never argued for them. In terms of changing the legal regime, Chinese scholars have been working to revive the one-hundred-year-old concept of "inter-temporal law." This means if a dispute has a history, you apply the law from when the dispute began. Chinese scholars want to apply law

from the Han Dynasty (Second Century AD). China does not agree that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea overrules historic rights, and it is developing the idea (the day after the award was released) of linked/group islands. With this concept, China can claim everything as a "big island." But since the features are not actually islands, this is problematic. China is also developing the idea of archipelagic rights, but this is also problematic, because the archipelago *itself* must be a state.

All of these attempts are limited by the fact that international law does not accept new principles today, so at best China could influence customary international practices. This option again is unlikely, since China controls only a small number of features in the Spratlys, and Vietnam would protest against any developments in the Paracels. In sum, China's prospects for both reinterpreting existing legal norms and creating new norms look poor.

2.2 China and global internet governance

Cai Cuihong continued the discussion, focusing on how China believes that global problems in cyberspace demand global governance. So far, this has not really happened, because there are overlapping cyberspace forums of governance and, at the same time, power is diffused into different groupings – systemic power (international organisations), instrumental power (state and governments), meta-power (private sector), and advocacy power (civil society) – making coordination nearly impossible. The main cyberspace disputes include questions over the global commons vs. internet sovereignty, American control/exceptionalism, , and the bringing together different values of global governance.

Global cyber governance remains convoluted, but one trend is clear: China is becoming a *de facto* cyber power; it has seven of the twenty most used websites, and its influence will only continue to grow as internet penetration has just passed 50 per cent. China conceives of itself as a "constructive participant" in global cyber governance. "Order first, innovation next, security all the way through." The United States maintains a much more flexible approach; China's approach is wary, and seeks to defend "internet sovereignty" and facilitate governmental dominance of cyberspace issues, even as it acknowledges the necessity of cooperating with non-governmental actors.

2.3 China in global governance of space and outer space

Jiang Tianjiao presented on the evolving question of space governance. Today, the weaponisation of space has become a key challenge. During the Persian Gulf War, space was used to enhance America's precision-strike regime, and then in 2001, Bush withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In response, in 2002, China and Russia proposed a treaty to prevent the weaponisation of space. This failed due to US opposition. China responded with the 2007 anti-satellite test, which had negative results. After this test, China has become much more careful about space debris. From 2008 to 2014, China attempted to push a Treaty on the Prevention of the Placing of Weapons in Outer Space, and enjoyed a victory in 2017 in the UN General Assembly.

China's own increasing assets in space have led it to stake out a very cautious position: it is wary about space debris, open to an institution to prevent a space arms race, and worried about the potential destructive behaviour of others as space capabilities become democratised.

Discussion

A discussion followed these three presentations, led by **Alexander Korolev** and **Caitriona Heinl**. Heinl wondered how disruptive innovation was possible in the Chinese cyber model if order was required first and which, if any, countries seemed to support China's cyber model. Korolev thought the idea of being a "responsible stakeholder" needed to be better developed in the context of space governance, specifically, that it should not be defined as simply whatever makes the United States happy. China's SCS claims were again discussed, and China was described as putting forward narrowly national-interest based arguments in contrast to UNCLOS, which seeks to promote as much inclusiveness as possible. In particular, China's position on the dispute is that it is entitled to claim all the waters of the SCS, but it is willing to share them and only claim the land. In the long term, however, China may come to recognise that UNCLOS actually protects the rights of maritime states, and is a good way to secure China's privileges.

PANEL THREE
Economy and Development

3.1 China and global financial governance: The case of credit rating

Giulia Mennillo presented on how China is working to break into the credit rating oligopoly currently dominated by the three big American firms, Moody's, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch, which together control 95 per cent of the market. A Chinese firm, Dagong Global, which has been operating in Europe since 2013 but so far has failed to gain access to the US market, claims to offer a different perspective from the big American three. Credit risk is a judgment, and so epistemic authority matters. There is also a political dimension, and China does not want to be excluded from this, especially since banks are no longer the main mediator in financial markets. Domestically, the Chinese bond market is the third largest in the world, and China has worked for a long time to build up its credit rating capability, allowing foreign rating agencies to operate in China on their own for the first time in July 2017. The question of Dagong's independence from the Chinese Government remains open for now.

3.2 China-Africa Economic Relations and "New Normal" Developmental Model

Lauren Johnston's presentation focused on China's economy and investment, which is an apt topic because for the first time, Chinese outbound investment exceeds inbound investment. China is "aging" – the percentage of its working population is just now beginning to fall – and is seeking low-hanging fruit growth in younger demographic frontiers (e.g., Africa). Of the grand Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Johnston pointed out that the Belt part is about integrating China further into the local economic systems via roads and land based connectivity infrastructures, while the Road part – which extends reaches Africa via sea routes – is focused on these "young" markets. Johnston remarked in this context that ten years ago, based on the trends of the time, one could predict that China was going to become an outbound investor by now, and that as a result, something like AIIB would likely be established. Today, China is still opening up and reforming, and as it "crosses the ocean by building ports", more enterprising investments in new areas in Africa will emerge. The fact that China's largest investments are in the banking sector in Africa indicates China's long-term ambitions in the continent.

3.3 A norm-taker or norm-maker? China's role in international development cooperation

Zhang Denghua made the last presentation in this section, moving the discussion to China's role in international development. In 1972, China began providing aid to UN agencies, even though it refused to receive aid from them until 1979, when it also began accepting aid from traditional donors. In 1995, China began its concessional loan programme. Finally, in 2000, China expanded its involvement in foreign aid significantly, including cooperating directly with UN agencies and other donors. Today, China is among the top ten donors of foreign aid. But many issues remain. China tends to use its own workers and materials; it seldom attends donor roundtable meetings for coordination; and there is little accountability for Chinese aid. China insists on "common but differentiated responsibilities," in contrast with other donors, and it does not attach political strings to its aid. Even so, China's behaviour seems to be changing. In Laos and Papua New Guinea, China has signed the local versions of international aid agreements, and in July 2015, Li Keqiang became the first Chinese leader to visit the OECD and China joined the OECD Development Centre. Chinese aid is likely to grow more ambitious in the future, even as it continues to selectively adapt its practices to international norms, such as aid monitoring and evaluation. China, hence, is both a norm-maker and a norm-taker.

Discussion

Following this presentation, a discussion was moderated by **Shaun Breslin** and **Wu Fengshi**. Breslin commented that it seemed bizarre that China has emulated the western credit rating model, despite the fact that such agencies failed in the Asian and global financial crises. This seemed like a puzzle to him. It also emerged from the discussion that China includes military aid as part of its "aid" numbers, as well as the construction of sports facilities.

Johnston added the following comments during a Question and Answer (Q & A) session that in China, more than two dozen government agencies are involved in foreign aid including Commerce, Finance, Foreign Affairs, so it is difficult to produce reliable aid data. China has said it will not set human rights or good governance preconditions for its aid to all entities, except Taiwan which has to fulfil certain preconditions before they are able

to receive aid from China. For Chinese concessional loan projects, it is a requirement that the recipients complete at least half of the project using Chinese materials. China claims that it is a developing country and that this is necessary to provide jobs. Additionally, Johnston pointed out that even so, "western standards" are not without problems. Even for "aid" that meets the OECD definition, much of it often does not actually ever enter the recipient country. For example, Chinese workers and project staff live in Chinese-style dormitories; while western aid officer's workers live with high quality facilities and amenities. China has put pressure on the international aid system to break this sort of norm. Aid is something that supports foreign investment, which is what China seems to really care about.

Both Wu and Breslin suggested to the panelists (particularly Zhang and Johnston) that it may be more effective for publication to highlight the difference between developmental assistance for economic cooperation and development assistance for humanitarian purposes. Zhang's paper explains more of the latter type of aids, where more convergence between Chinese practices and western standards has taken place over the years.

PANEL FOUR
Health, Humanitarian Affairs, and International Cooperation

4.1 China and global health norm development

Yanzhong Huang began the final panel with a presentation on China's quest to become a global health governance leader. He asked three questions. Why does China want to engage in global health norm development? How has it participated? And what does that tell us about the prospect of China becoming a leader? The *why* question is fairly easy to answer: to become a responsible stakeholder, to expand its international influence, and to facilitate absolute gains. On the other hand, the *how* question involves agenda setting, norm-making, and norm-taking.

China has historically not shown a strong interest in leading global health, traditionally operating as a facilitator or follower. To this day, it is not yet an agenda setter: it has not provided an alternative vision of the current paradigm, and it has a mixed record in applying international health norms. On norm-making, China has been involved in strengthening biological

weapons conviction, the Doha round, and other initiatives. Sovereignty has been important throughout, but Taiwan also gets in the way and can cause problems. In World Health Organization reforms, China has pushed the power of member states at the exclusion of non-state actors. On norm-taking, China had a mixed record. China has undermined the global Framework for Tobacco Control regime, especially the use of pictorial warning labels. During the 2009 flu outbreak, China probably overreacted, becoming disruptive. In the field of medicine, in contrast, China has done a good job protecting intellectual property. But China has perhaps gone too far here, refusing important generic drugs from India. In sum: China's involvement in global health is comparatively small, but is expected to play a larger role in the future.

4.2 China and global refugee crisis: beyond reputational *gain*

Wu Fengshi presented a paper she developed with **Chan Xin Ying**, on the current "shock" occurring within China's refugee regime. Contrary to common perception, there are around 300,000 refugees officially recognised and currently living in China. In 2017, China increased its donations to the UN high commission on refugees by five times to around $14 million.

China treats each refugee crisis as a unique political event and does not have a standard institutionalised procedure for refugee crises. For instance, Vietnamese refugees from the 1970s have gradually obtained most of the basic civil and economic rights in the cities where they reside in China, including partial naturalisation and local self-rule. But North Korean refugees do not get official recognition. In recent years, refugees and forced migrants are treated by the regulations that are embedded in the general legal frameworks for foreigners working and residing in China.

While China's stand on the refugee issues reflects its main principles in foreign affairs (such as non-intervention, state sovereign integrity and the central role of the United Nations (UN) in global governance) and the particular geopolitical conditions of existing and potential refugee influx to the country, it has come forward and expressed more willingness to contribute to relevant global agencies and humanitarian relief for refugees. China's rhetoric on the root causes for refugees may seem to be divergent from what the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) advocates for, but can win sympathy and support from other important members of the UN that face similar dilemma associated with refugees from neighbouring

(L-R) Jiang Tianjiao, Cai Cuihong, Wang Jiangyu, Wu Fengshi, Li Mingjiang

(L-R) Wu Fengshi, Li Mingjiang, Hoo Tiang Boon, Shaun Breslin

(L-R) He Kai, Katherine Morton, Richard Bush III, Huang Yanzhong, Titus Chen

(L-R) Zhang Denghua, Lauren Johnston, Giulia Mennillo

countries and a large number of overseas diaspora population such as Russia and Turkey. The new proposals of "return with safety and dignity" may seem to be a necessary compromise as the result of the unpreparedness from the societies in Germany and other EU countries to host Syrian refugees, but it incidentally echoes parts of what China has always argued on the issue about how refugees are not migrants. Such a rare case of overlapping in norms may offer some hope for deeper collaboration between UNHCR and China, and China's handling of refugees in future.

The rise of public interest in and reaction to global refugee crisis (mostly the Syrian crisis) indicates the deepening of China's global integration. Unlike the previous wave of globalisation which is driven by the state and carried by commodities, this new wave of globalisation can be viewed as globalisation at social and individual levels. If in Yiwu city, refugees from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia can feel at home and enjoy family support, how long will it take for the rest of China to face the reality that refugees are not that alien and remote, but possibly part of our own kin? By then, it is not international reputational gain or loss that the Chinese government should consider when making decisions about refugees.

4.3 What exactly has China contended for (or against)? Understanding Chinese discourse in International Human Rights Institutions

Titus Chen presented on China's relations with the global human rights regime, arguing that China has successfully promoted the norm that development is a precondition for rights. China did not join the UN Human Rights Commission until 1982. In the 1990s, China tended (in principle) to passively adopt global treaties and norms, with Jiang Zemin recognising the universality of human rights towards the end of the 20th century. In the mid-2000s, however, China seemed to pivot to a "branding and shouting" strategy, and increased its influence with the creation of the Universal Periodic Review in 2005-2006, which the Chinese perceived as a more equitable system for international monitoring of human rights violation and compliance. Applying the method of discourse analysis, Chen and his collaborators find that democratising international relations, opposing racism, mainstreaming human rights with Chinese characteristics, in addition to the emphasis on development as seen in the Sustainable Development Goals, are all leading areas of emphasis for China in its activities within global governance of human rights.

4.4 China, the G20, and Global Governance

Jared McKinney presented on China's interactions with G20. According to his research, China has prioritised the G20 as a forum for advertising its priorities, but, as a result of the G20 becoming something of a "talk shop", China is increasingly prioritising its own regional initiatives in lieu of reform of global governance. Reform of international bodies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, initially pioneered within the G20 Grouping, is stalled today. As a result of institutional blocks within these bodies, redistributing voting shares is almost impossible. China has acknowledged this reality and is responding by taking what He Yafei has called a "proactive approach" to global governance. This means building up its own institutions (e.g., the AIIB, the Belt and Road Initiative, the New Development Bank, etc.) in order to overcome stalled global reform. This path is seen by Xi Jinping both as a way for China to exercise international leadership and to promote the innovation and investment agenda needed to propel China past the middle-income trap.

Discussion

He Kai and **Hoo Tiang Boon** moderated the discussion that followed, which focused on the tension between sovereignty and global health imperatives: bacteria. Health has been a less sensitive area for China to cooperate with other nations, and it is an area of competitive advantage for China, which has a rich experience in malaria control. Chinese health agencies, in particular, apparently do not have enough to do domestically and are seeking new experiences through cooperation in foreign environments. In Africa, the Chinese are opening health training schools and colleges, and medical equipment factories. It was generally agreed there is a lot of potential here for positive future growth.

Countering to intuitive estimation, the normative gap between China and global agencies in the fields of humanitarian assistance is shrinking as Xi Jinping has a more ambitious plan for China to play on the global stage than his predecessors. Despite its rigid stand on civic and political rights and individual liberty, China's willingness to learn, participate, donate, and take more responsibilities in development, and refugee and other humanitarian aids is obvious.

Biographies

Richard Bush is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Co-Director of its Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, and a holder of the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies. Bush came to Brookings in July 2002 after serving almost five years as the Chairman and Managing Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) – the mechanism through which the US Government conducts substantive relations with Taiwan in the absence of diplomatic relations.

Bush began his professional career in 1977 with the China Council of The Asia Society. From July 1983 to June 1995, he worked as the staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, first as a Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs (chair, Steve Solarz), and then as a Full Committee (chair, Lee Hamilton). In July 1995, he became the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and a member of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), which coordinates the analytic work of the intelligence committee. He left the NIC in September 1997 to become head of AIT.

Bush received his undergraduate education at Lawrence University in Appleton, Wisconsin. He did his graduate work in political science at Columbia University, getting an MA in 1973 and his PhD in 1978. He is the author of numerous articles on US relations with China and Taiwan, and of *At Cross Purposes: US-Taiwan Relations Since 1942*, a book of essays on the history of America's relations with Taiwan (M. E. Sharpe, 2004). In July 2005, Brookings published *Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait* authored by Bush. In March 2007, through Wylie Publishers, Bush and his Brookings colleague, Michael O'Hanlon, released *A War Like No Other: The Truth About China's Challenge to America*. In 2010, Brookings published his *Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations*, which focused on growing tensions in the East China Sea. In January 2013, Brookings published his *Uncharted Strait: The Future of China-Taiwan Relations*. In August 2016, Brookings released his *Hong Kong in the Shadow of China: Living with the Leviathan*.

Shaun Breslin is a Professor of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, and the co-editor of *The Pacific Review*. Having first studied in China in 1984, he has spent the last thirty years trying to understand the political economy of contemporary China and China's place

in the world. He also has a side interest in comparative studies of regional integration processes. From October 2017, he holds a Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship, that will focus on the linkages between China's domestic economy, and the nature of China as a Great Power.

Cai Cuihong is a Professor of International Relations at the Center for American Studies of Fudan University. Prior to the present job, she worked for the Foreign Affairs Office of Fudan University during 1996-2001. She received her BS (1993) and MS (1996) in biophysics, and her PhD (2002) in international relations from Fudan University. She also holds a BA (2001) in English language and literature from Shanghai International Studies University. She was a visiting scholar at the Georgia Institute of Technology in 2002, and at the University of California, Berkeley in 2007, as well as an invited Fellow in the 2007 programme on US National Security sponsored by the US State Department. Dr. Cai has authored *Political Development in the Cyber Age* (Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2015), *U.S. National Information Security Strategy* (Shanghai: Academia Press, 2009) and *Internet and International Politics* (Shanghai: Academia Press, 2003), as well as several dozen articles and papers on cyberpolitics, cyberspace governance, cybersecurity strategy and Sino-US relations.

Chan Xin Ying is a Research Analyst with the Malaysia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) of Nanyang Technological University (NTU). Before joining RSIS, Xin Ying was a Senior Programme Assistant in the Health Unit for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Kuala Lumpur, where she conducted ethnic verification interviews and managed health aids for the refugees in Malaysia. Her research interests include China and Malaysia relations; overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and the rise of China; and lastly, refugee issues in Malaysia (focusing on Rohingya and Ughyur refugees). Xin Ying possesses a degree in International Affair Management from the Universiti Utara Malaysia, and completed her MSc in Asian Studies at RSIS.

Chen Titus C. is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan. Dr Chen specialises in International Relations Theory, International Norms and Organisation, East Asian International Relations, and Digital Qualitative Methods. He holds a doctoral degree of Political Science from the University of California,

Irvine. Prior to joining the National Sun Yat-sen University in 2014, Dr Chen had worked as a Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan (2009-2014), and as a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Center for International Studies, University of Southern California (2008-2009). Dr Chen has published in major academic journals (both in English and in Chinese). Currently, he is working on a book manuscript examining the politics of human rights in China's domestic governance and her foreign relations.

Huang Yanzhong is a Senior Fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he directs the Global Health Governance roundtable. He is also the Professor and Director of Global Health Studies at Seton Hall University's School of Diplomacy and International Relations, where he developed the first academic concentration among US professional schools of international affairs that explicitly addresses the security and foreign policy aspects of health issues. He is the founding editor of *Global Health Governance*: *The Scholarly Journal for the New Health Security Paradigm*.

Huang has written extensively on global health governance, health diplomacy and health security, and public health in China and East Asia. He has published numerous reports, journal articles, and book chapters, including articles in *Survival, Foreign Affairs*, *Public Health, Bioterrorism and Biosecurity*, and the *Journal of Contemporary China*, as well as op-ed pieces in the *New York Times*, *International Herald Tribune, YaleGlobal,* and *Straits Times*, among others. In 2006, he co-authored the first scholarly article that systematically examined China's soft power. He is frequently consulted by major media outlets, the private sector, and governmental and non-governmental organisations on global health issues and China. He has also been regularly invited to speak at leading academic institutions and think tanks. He is a board member of the Institute of Global Health (Georgia), an Academic Advisor of the Center for China and Globalisation, and an editorial board member of *East Asian Policy*. In 2012, he was listed by *InsideJersey* as one of the "20 Brainiest People in New Jersey." He was a Research Associate at the National Asia Research Programme, a public intellectuals' Fellow at the National Committee on US-China Relations, an Associate Fellow at the Asia Society, a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore, and a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He has taught at Barnard College

and Columbia University. He obtained his BA and MA degrees from Fudan University, and his PhD degree from the University of Chicago.

He Kai is a Professor of International Relations at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, Australia. He is currently an Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow. He was a postdoctoral Fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Programme (2009-2010). He is the author of *Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific: Economic Interdependence and China's Rise* (Routledge, 2009), *Prospect Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in the Asia Pacific: Rational Leaders and Risky Behavior* (co-authored with Huiyun Feng, Routledge, 2013), and *China's Crisis Behavior: Political Survival and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, 2016). His peer-reviewed articles have appeared in *European Journal of International Relations, European Political Science Review, Review of International Studies, Security Studies, International Politics, Cooperation and Conflict, Asian Survey, The Pacific Review, Journal of Contemporary China, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Asian Security, Asian Perspective, International Relations of the Asia Pacific*, and *Issues and Studies*.

Caitríona Heinl has worked as a Research Fellow on international security cyber issues at Nanyang Technical University (NTU), Singapore since 2012. Her research interests include global cyber policy and emerging technology security challenges such as AI, machine learning and autonomous weapons systems. She publishes policy reports and academic articles, contributes to research projects, and frequently addresses global audiences including ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), United Nations (UN) and Track 1.5/Track 2 government events. She is currently responsible for strategy and policy under the Nanyang Business School Cyber Risk Management project, having transferred from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Centre of Excellence for National Security at NTU.

Heinl previously led the Justice and Home Affairs policy group and Justice Steering Committee at the Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA), Ireland where she was responsible for research on transnational crimes. She qualified as a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (currently non-practising) and is admitted as an Attorney-at-Law in New York. She is a member of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Foreign

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Hoo Tiang Boon is the Assistant Professor with the China Programme, and Coordinator of the MSc (Asian Studies) programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU). He holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of Oxford. He is the lecturer of the Masters courses, *China's Foreign and Security Policy* and *Cross-Strait Relations*, at RSIS. Dr Hoo is the author of several publications on China, cross-strait relations, and US-China relations. He has spoken about his work at various venues, including Harvard University, University of Oxford, University of Manchester, Bristol University, and the International Studies Association Convention. He has been involved in several diplomatic initiatives, including the Singapore-US Strategic Dialogue, Singapore-France Dialogue on China, the Korea-Singapore Forum, and the Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions. Dr Hoo is an overseas expert in the China Think tank network of the Development Research Centre of China's State Council. He was formerly a Visiting Fellow at the China Foreign Affairs University, a Visiting Scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and a Visiting Researcher at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies.

Jiang Tianjiao is a PhD candidate at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, as well as a Predoctoral Fellow (2017-2018) at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University. He received his bachelor's degree in law at Fudan and started his PhD programme on arms control and regional security in 2013. His research focuses on space security, cyber security and strategic stability between China and the United States. He is also a member of the International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Youth Group, and the Wilson Center's Asia-Pacific Nuclear History Institute. He has published both English and Chinese papers in the *Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies*, *Chinese Political Science Review*, *Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies*, and *American Studies Quarterly.*

Lauren A. Johnston is a Research Fellow at the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Melbourne. Her research in development and international economics has a regional focus on China and Africa, and the China-Africa economic nexus. She is a co-editor of the *China Update* – an annual volume on the Chinese economy published in both English and Chinese – and Melbourne course convener of Taiwan Business and Economics, taught by National Chengchi University (Taiwan).

Prior to joining the Melbourne Institute, Lauren taught Chinese economy at the Beijing Foreign Studies University; held positions at the World Bank in Washington, World Economic Forum in Geneva, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Overseas Development Institute (Fellow, Ministries of Finance of Sierra Leone, and Guyana, 2003-05); and was an editor (statistics) for Taylor and Francis (London). Lauren holds a PhD in International Economics from Peking University (2013), MSc Development Economics (London (SOAS)) and a BA/BCom from the University of Melbourne.

Alexander Korolev is a Research Fellow at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation. His research interests include International Relations Theory and Comparative Politics, Russia's Foreign Policy and China-Russia relations, Political Transition in former socialist countries, Politics of Social Reforms, and Theory and Practice of democracy. Dr Korolev's recent publications have appeared in *Journal of Strategic Studies, International Studies Review, Pacific Affairs, Chinese Journal of International Politics, China Review, Journal of Chinese Political Science*, and the *Asan Forum*. He is working on several projects, among which International Cooperation in the Development of Russia's Far East and Siberia, Russia's Reorientation to the East and Strategic Implications to East Asia and the World, Balancing Behaviour of States under the Conditions of Declining Unipolarity. He received an MA in International Relations from Nankai University, Zhou Enlai School of Government (2009), and PhD in Political Science from the Chinese University of Hong Kong (2012). He was a visiting researcher at the Political Science Department of Brown University (2011-2012).

Li Mingjiang is an Associate Professor at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He is also the Coordinator of the China Programme at RSIS.

He received his PhD in Political Science from Boston University. His main research interests include China-ASEAN relations, Sino-US relations, Asia Pacific security, and domestic sources of Chinese foreign policy. He is the author (including editor and co-editor) of 12 books. His recent books are *New Dynamics in US-China Relations: Contending for the Asia Pacific* (lead editor, Routledge, 2014) and *Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet Split* (Routledge, 2012). He has published papers in various peer-reviewed journals including the *Journal of Strategic Studies*, *Global Governance*, *Cold War History*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, *the Chinese Journal of Political Science*, *China: An International Journal*, *China Security, Harvard Asia Quarterly, Security Challenges*, and *the International Spectator*. Dr Li frequently participates in various track-two events on East Asian regional security.

Jared McKinney is a PhD student at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He holds masters' degrees from the London School of Economics (Department of International History), Peking University (School of International Studies) and Missouri State University (Department of Defense and Strategic Studies). He has published in *Asian Security* and *Third World Quarterly*.

Giulia Mennillo is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Department of Political Science at the National University of Singapore (NUS). She holds a PhD from the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland. She was a Visiting Researcher at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, at the University of Warwick, and at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University. Her research interests lie in International Political Economy, with a special focus on finance. Her research agenda deals primarily with the politics of credit ratings as the common language of risk in financial market practices.

Katherine Morton is the Chair and Professor of China's International Relations at the University of Sheffield. Her research addresses the domestic and international motivations behind China's changing role in the world and the implications for foreign policy and the study of International Relations. Prior to her appointment at the University of Sheffield, she was the Associate Dean for Research at the College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University (ANU) and a Senior Fellow in the Department

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Wang Jiangyu (SJD & LLM, University of Pennsylvania; MJur, Oxford; MPhil in Laws, Peking University; LLB, China University of Political Science and Law) is a tenured Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law of the National University of Singapore (NUS). He is an Executive Editor of the Asian Journal of Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press) and Deputy Chief Editor of the Chinese Journal of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press). He was the founding Deputy Director of the Centre for Asian Legal Studies of NUS Law from 2012 to 2016. His teaching and research interests include international economic law, international law, and international relations, Chinese and comparative corporate and securities law, law and development, and the Chinese legal system. He practiced law in the Legal Department of Bank of China, and Chinese and American law firms. He served as a member of the Chinese delegation at the annual conference of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Conference in 1999. He is qualified to practice law in China and New York. He is also a member of the Governing Council of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Institute of the China Law Society, a Senior Fellow at the Law and Development Institute (LDI), and a fellow of the Asian Institute of International Financial Law (Hong Kong). He has been an invited expert/speaker for the WTO, International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO), United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). He has published extensively in Chinese and international journals on a variety of law and politics related topics, and is a regular contributor to leading newspapers and magazines in Singapore, Hong Kong, and mainland China. He served as an external reviewer for dozens of international journals and publishers and research funds. From August 2006 to July 2009, he was on second ament as an Associate Professor

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Wu Fengshi (BA from Beijing University, PhD from the University of Maryland), Associate Professor and Deputy Coordinator of the MSc in IR programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, is specialised in environmental politics, Chinese politics, and global governance. Before joining RSIS (China Programme), she was an assistant and associate professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (2005-2013) and a visiting Fellow at the Harvard-Yenching Institute (2008-09). She was among the inaugural class of the Graduate Fellows of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences (2004). She is a leading expert on China's environmental politics and social activism, and her recent publications have appeared in the *International Studies Quarterly, China Journal, VOLUMTAS (International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisations), Issues and Studies, Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning, China Perspectives, Journal of Contemporary China, and Journal of Chinese Political Science*.

Zhang Denghua had a decade long work experience as a diplomat in China before he resigned to join the Australian National University (ANU). He submitted his PhD thesis on China's foreign aid, especially trilateral aid cooperation at the ANU in March 2017. His research focuses on international relations, development studies, Chinese foreign policy, Chinese foreign aid, and Asian powers in the Pacific. He has published more than 20 papers on Chinese foreign policy and foreign aid including recently with *Third World Quarterly*, *The Pacific Review, The Round Table* and *The Journal of Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies.*

Workshop Programme

Friday, 17 November 2017

08:30 – 08:50 REGISTRATION

08:50 – 09:00 WELCOME

09:00 – 10:30 PANEL 1
Overview and introduction

<u>Chair</u>
Assoc Prof Li Mingjiang, Coordinator of China Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Prof Shaun Breslin
Professor of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick
China and the Challenge to Liberal Universalism

Asst Prof Hoo Tiang Boon
China Programme, IDSS and Coordinator of the M.Sc. (Asian Studies) Programme, RSIS
Xi's China and the Pursuit of the Responsible Power Identity

Prof He Kai
Professor of International Relations, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, Australia
China, Role Identity, and Global Governance: Insights from AIIB

Prof Katherine Morton
Chair and Professor of China's International Relations, School of East Asian Studies, The University of Sheffield
China's Evolving Strategy towards Counter-Terrorism

<u>Discussants</u>
Assoc Prof Li Mingjiang; and
Dr Richard Bush, S. Rajaratnam Professor of Strategic Studies, RSIS; Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, and Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, The Brookings Institution

10:30 – 10:45 TEA BREAK

10:45 – 12:30   PANEL 2
Security and new security

<u>Chair</u>
Dr Alexander Korolev, Research Fellow, Lee Kuan Yew School of
Public Policy, National University of Singapore

Assoc Prof Wang Jiangyu
Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore
*China and the International Law of the Sea: Compliance,
Resistance, and Norm Creation*

Prof Cai Cuihong
Professor of International Relations, Center for American Studies,
Fudan University
China and Global Internet Governance

Mr Jiang Tianjiao
PhD Candidate, School of International Relations and Public
Affairs, Fudan University
China in Global Governance of Space and Outer Space

<u>Discussants</u>
Dr Alexander Korolev; and
Ms Caitriona Heinl, Research Fellow, Cyber Policy & Strategy,
Cyber Risk Management Project, Nanyang Business School

12:30 – 14:00   LUNCH

14:00 – 15:30   PANEL 3
Economy and development
<u>Chair</u>
Assoc Prof Wu Fengshi, China Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Dr Giulia Mennillo
Post-Doctoral Fellow, Political Science Department, National
University of Singapore
China and Global Financial Regime: Credit Rating

Dr Lauren Johnston
Research Fellow, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and
Social Research, Faculty of Business and Economics, University
of Melbourne
*China-Africa Economic Relations and "New Normal"
Developmental Model*

Dr Zhang Denghua
PhD Scholar, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National University
A Norm-taker or Norm-maker? China's Role in International Development Cooperation

Discussants
Prof Shaun Breslin and Assoc Prof Wu Fengshi

15:30 – 16:00   TEA BREAK

16:00 – 17:45   PANEL 4
Health, humanitarian affairs and international cooperation

Chair
Asst Prof Hoo Tiang Boon

Prof Yanzhong Huang
Professor and Director, Center for Global Health Studies, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University; and Senior Fellow for Global Health, Council on Foreign Relations
China and Global Health Norm Development

Assoc Prof Wu Fengshi and
Ms Chan Xin Ying
Research Analyst, Malaysia Programme, IDSS, RSIS
China and Global Refugee Crisis: Beyond Reputational Gain

Dr Titus Chen
Associate Professor of Political Science, National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan
What Exactly Has China Contended For (or Against)? Understanding Chinese Discourse in International Human Rights Institutions

Mr Jared McKinney
PhD Candidate, RSIS
China's Engagement with the G20

Discussants
Prof He Kai and Asst Prof Hoo Tiang Boon

17:45 – 18:00   CONCLUDING REMARKS

About the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

The **Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)** is a key research component of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). It focuses on defence and security research to serve national needs. IDSS faculty and research staff conducts both academic and policy-oriented research on security-related issues and developments affecting Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific. IDSS is divided into three research clusters: (i) The Asia Pacific cluster – comprising the China, South Asia, United States, and Regional Security Architecture programmes; (ii) The Malay Archipelago cluster – comprising the Indonesia and Malaysia programmes; and (iii) The Military and Security cluster – comprising the Military Transformations, Maritime Security, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) programmes. Finally, the Military Studies Programme, the wing that provides military education, is also a part of IDSS.

For more information, please visit www.rsis.edu.sg/research/idss.

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The **S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)** is a professional graduate school of international affairs at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. RSIS' mission is to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of security studies and international affairs. Its core functions are research, graduate education and networking. It produces cutting-edge research on Asia Pacific Security, Multilateralism and Regionalism, Conflict Studies, Non-Traditional Security, International Political Economy, and Country and Region Studies. RSIS' activities are aimed at assisting policymakers to develop comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking on issues related to security and stability in the Asia Pacific.

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